The median voter hypothesis plays an important role in endogenous growth theories. It provides the political mechanism through which voters in more unequal countries redistribute a larger proportion of income and thus, it is argued, by blunting incentives reduce country's growth rate. However, due to the lack of data on factor income (i.e. pre-tax and transfer) distribution across households, and thus on the exact amount of gain by the poorest half of households ("the poor"), the hypothesis was never properly tested. We test it here on 79 observations drawn from household budget surveys from 24 democracies. We find that the data strongly support the hypothesis that countries with more unequal distribution of factor income redistribute more in favor of the poor-even when we control for the share of the elderly in the population, or for pension transfers. But the evidence on the exact mechanism whereby this takes place-the median voter hypothesis-is much weaker. We do find that the middle income groups gain more/or lose less through redistribution in countries where initial (factor) income distribution is more unequal, but this regularity evaporates only we drop pensions from social transfers and focus solely on the more redistributive social transfers. Furthermore, we cannot show that the middle income groups are always net beneficiaries of redistribution nor that the existing tax and transfer system are optimal from their perspective (in the sense that all alternative tax rates would yield lower net benefits to the middle income groups).
preferences are single-peaked, and (3) all (or almost all) individuals are voters. The last point implies that the relationship between market-generated inequality and redistribution should be stronger in democracies than in authoritarian regimes where the governments can decide to ignore the preferences of the poor (see Perotti 1996, p. 171; Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, p. 478) .
Almost no author among the many who have written on the subject empirically estimates the structural equation (the political mechanism equation). What the authors do in the empirical part is to estimate the reduced form equation where inequality in distribution of disposable income is used as a regressor to explain growth rate over a period of time (Persson and Tabellini 1991; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Alesina and Perotti 1994; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) . They do this because the data needed to estimate the structural equation are much more difficult to obtain: factor income distribution was, until recently, unavailable and if one lacks factor income distribution, one cannot calculate the extent of redistribution. Thus, neither the extent of redistribution nor the mechanism by which it occurs-the median voter hypothesis-was tested directly.
There are, however, a few exceptions. Perotti (1993 and 1996) , Easterly and Rebelo (1993, p. 436) , and Bassett, Burkett and Putterman (1999) where the T denotes taxes or social transfers as a share of GDP, or as in Perotti (1996) the marginal tax rate. Id is an index of inequality of disposable income, and Z other relevant variables (e.g. a democracy dummy variable, or percent of population over 65 years of age since this their larger share should imply greater transfers for pensions). Perotti's 1996 paper presents the most detailed test of the hypothesis. He finds lack of a significant relationship between the equality variable ("middle class share" defined as the combined income shares of the third and fourth quintiles of the population ranked according to disposable income) and marginal tax rate in various formulations: whether the share of the middle class is included alone in the equation, or is interacted with a democracy dummy. Even in a sample of democracies alone the coefficient has the right sign but is not significant (Perotti, 1996, Table 8, p. 170) . When, instead of marginal tax rate, Perotti uses, on the left-hand side, social security and welfare, or health and housing, or education expenditures (each as a share of GDP), greater inequality in disposable income is associated with greater social transfers only in the case of democracies and for social security and welfare alone. Perotti concludes (p. 172) that "…there is … very little evidence of a negative association between equality and fiscal variables in democracies. It is true that in the political mechanism, [the variable that interacts the share of the middle class and democracy] has the expected negative sign in four cases out of six, but social security and welfare is the only type of expenditure for which it is significant." More recently, Bassett, Burkett and Putterman (1999) have reestimated these relationships using three redistribution proxies (public transfers, social security transfers, and social security and education as share of GDP), and share of the middle quintiles in disposable income as inequality proxy. They too find that the coefficient on the median voter either has a "wrong" sign (higher share of the middle class increases transfers) or is not statistically significant. Moreover, the results are highly unstable. Thus, in the two only direct empirical tests of the median voter hypothesis, the hypothesis is found wanting.
However, this approach is doubly unfortunate because both the lefthand side and the right-hand side variables are misspecified. On the righthand side, there is disposable income inequality which is inequality after both taxes and transfers. However, people's voting decisions on redistribution are based on their incomes before redistribution. 4 It is methodologically incorrect to explain people's decision about the optimal level of taxes and transfers as dependent on the distribution which emerges as a consequence of that decision. This approach creates also a time-consistency problem, for in reality, people first receive their factor incomes, and then decide how much of it they are willing to redistribute through taxation and social transfers. Therefore, the methodologically correct approach is to make the decision on the extent of redistribution depend on the distribution of market or factor (pre-transfer and pre-tax) income.
The dependent variable (the share of government transfers in GDP, or the marginal tax rate) is also wrong. It is not the share of GDP that matters but how redistributive the transfers and taxes are. One can easily imagine a situation where a society has large taxes and transfers whose contributors and beneficiaries are the same people. Looking at transfers' or taxes' share in GDP would give the mistaken impression that the society has chosen a lot of redistribution while the reality is exactly the opposite: redistribution may be minimal. In effect, corporatist societies of continental Europe (Austria, Germany) are often considered (see Esping-Andersen, 1990 ) to engage predominantly in such kinds of policies. Le Grand (1982) has similarly argued that most transfers are captured by the middle class. The essential point is that size of transfers is an imperfect indicator of the amount of redistribution. A correct approach would be to look at how much have the bottom groups of population (according to factor income) increased their share in disposable income, that is what is their income gain. Therefore, the relationship we want to test is:
where R = an index of redistribution, Im = an index of inequality of factor incomes. Equation (2) says that the extent of redistribution is a function of initial inequality with which factor income is distributed. Note that this formulation is quite flexible: voters may decide to choose small but very redistributive programs, or a series of large, but less redistributive, programs. Both may reduce initial inequality equally.
There are two hypotheses we want to test. First, that more unequal countries redistribute more; second, to look at how one possible explanation of why this may be so-the median voter hypothesis-performs. These are two distinct hypotheses. The first is a purely empirical statement. The second is a specific political mechanism.
Note that both sides of equation (2) are different from (1). This is because both sides of (1) are proxies for the "true" variables: the share of transfers in GDP or the marginal tax rate, proxy for redistribution; inequality in distribution of disposable income proxies for inequality in distribution of factor income. As mentioned before, the reason why researchers were using equation (1) rather than (2) is because information on factor income inequality which is indispensable to calculate both sides of equations (2) is, for most countries, unavailable. In effect, the income distribution statistics that we normally have are almost without exception statistics of disposable or gross (market plus transfers) income. It is only recently that, thanks to Luxembourg Income Survey (LIS) data base, factor income distributions for a number of countries have become available. The LIS data enable one to observe how income distribution changes as one moves from the pure marketdetermined incomes to incomes that include also government cash transfers (gross income) and finally to disposable income (gross income minus direct personal taxes). Moreover, since almost all countries in the LIS data base are democracies, the two hypotheses can be tested precisely for the countries where they are supposed to hold the most.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data base. Section III looks at the relationship between factor income inequality and redistribution. Section IV tests the median voter hypothesis, and Section V concludes the paper.
II. Description of the data base
We use the data for 24 countries which were are, with two exceptions, democracies at the time of the surveys. 5 The following country data sets are included: Australia 1981 Australia , 1985 Australia , 1989 Australia , and 1994 Belgium 1985 Belgium , 1988 Belgium and 1992 Canada 1975 Canada , 1987 Canada , 1991 Canada and 1994 Czech Republic 1992; Denmark 1987 and 1992; Finland 1987 Finland , 1991 Finland and 1995 France 1979 France , 1981 France , 1984 France and 1989 West Germany 1973 , 1978 , 1981 , 1984 , 1989 Hungary 1991; Ireland 1987; Israel 1979 Israel , 1986 Israel and 1992 Italy 1986 Italy , 1991 Italy and 1995 Luxembourg 1985 Luxembourg , 1991 Luxembourg and 1994 the Netherlands 1983 the Netherlands , 1987 the Netherlands , 1991 the Netherlands and 1994 Norway 1986 Norway , 1991 Norway and 1995 Poland 1986 Poland , 1992 Poland , and 1995 Taiwan (Province of China) 1981 , 1986 , 1991 and 1995 Russia 1992 and 1995; Slovakia 1992; Spain 1980 and 1990; Sweden 1967 Sweden , 1975 Sweden , 1981 Sweden , 1987 Sweden , 1992 Sweden and 1995 Switzerland 1982; United Kingdom 1969 , 1974 , 1979 , 1986 , 1991 and 1995 United States 1974 , 1979 , 1986 , 1991 and 1997 . Most of the countries were long established democracies-with at least 20 years of uninterrupted democratic experience prior to the survey-while several had only a few years of democracy prior to the survey (e.g. Spain in 1980 , Russia in 1992 , Czech republic and Slovakia in 1992 , Hungary in 1991 , Taiwan in 1991 . We define as established democracies (EDs) all the countries with exception of transition countries (Russia, Czech republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary) and Taiwan.
As mentioned, the source of data is Luxembourg Income Survey (LIS) which, using the countries' own household income surveys, 6 tries to standardize them by making the definitions of various variables (e.g. pension income, factor income, remittances etc.) the same or as similar as possible. LIS represents the only such source of standardized individual unit record data for developed market economies. We have used all the data that LIS currently (Fall 1999) has. They came from four "waves": the first from mid-1970's and early 1980's; the second, from the second half of the 1980's; the third from the late 1980's and early 1990's; and the first from mid-1990's up to 1997.
There is thus a total of 79 country observations. For each observation, we have the average per capita income in local currency by decile, for the following six distributions:
(1) distribution of factor income (when individuals are ranked by household per capita factor income), (2) distribution of factor income P which is equal to factor income (1) plus pension transfers (when individuals are ranked by household per capita factor income P), (3) distribution of gross income (when individuals are ranked by household per capita gross income) (4) distribution of disposable income (when individuals are ranked by household per capita disposable income) (5) distribution of disposable income when individuals are ranked by household per capita factor income. (6) distribution of disposable income when individuals are ranked by household per capita factor income P.
pensions. This is a factor income definition specially created for this study. The reason why we want to include pensions with the usual factor incomes is because pensions are a very specific transfer which does not respond to current contingencies nor whose objective is redistribution of income. Pensions, of course, are deferred wages with some redistribution component. By treating pensions as factor income, we can focus better on other social transfers (unemployment benefits, family allowances, and social assistance) whose redistributive function is undeniable.
Gross income is equal to factor income plus all government cash transfers. Finally, disposable income is equal to gross income minus direct personal taxes and mandatory employee contributions.
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For each type of distribution data listed above, we can easily calculate indicators of inequality as well as indexes of redistribution. For example, Tables 1a and 1b show the average Gini coefficients for the four concepts of income (factor, factor P, gross, disposable). Ginis for individual countries are shown in Annex Table 1 . Each concept focuses on a different underlying cause of inequality. Factor income inequality reflects the distribution of human, physical and financial assets as well as their relative prices. This would be distribution in the absence of any government action. 9 Gross income adjusts only for government cash transfers. Finally, disposable income distribution-a statistics that is most commonly used-shows actual differences in the purchasing power between individuals. A simple example may show how the concepts highlight different facets of distribution. Consider Sweden and the US in the mid-1990's. In terms of disposable income inequality they are, as everybody knows, very different: the Gini for Sweden is 26, the Gini for the US much higher -actually the highest among non-farm self-employment income (V5) + cash property income (V8) ] plus private pensions (V32) plus occupational public pensions (V33) plus alimony received (V34) plus other regular private income (V35) (household transfers) plus other cash income (V36). Our factor P income is equal to our factor income plus cash social security benefits for old age or survivors (V19). 8 The exact definitions are as follows. Gross income is equal to factor income plus social insurance transfers (sick pay, disability pay, social retirement benefits, child or family allowances, maternity pay, military or veterans benefits, and other social insurance) plus social assistance transfers (means-tested cash benefits and near-cash benefits). Gross income minus mandatory employee contributions minus income tax equals disposable income. See Luxembourg Income Study variable definitions in http://lissy.ceps.lu.summary.htm. 9 This is somewhat of a simplification because if the government were truly absent, there would be, for example, more private pensions (which are currently "crowded out" by government pensions) and the factor distribution would be different. all established democracies-42.3 (in 1997 ). Yet, the two countries are almost identical in terms of factor income inequality, or in other words, in terms of underlying asset distributions: Sweden factor income Gini in the 1990's is 51-52, while the US's Gini ranges between 50 and 53.
Finally using the data from (5) and (6) [when income concept and the ranking criterion differ], we can calculate exactly the extent of gain realized by lower income groups through the operation of the government transfer and tax systems. On average, government transfers and taxes reduce factor income inequality by more 14 Gini points (Table 1a and Table 1b ). Almost a third of factor-income inequality is thus "shaved off" due to government action. Most of the reduction, 7.8 Gini points for the entire sample, or 9.7 Gini points for the established democracies, is achieved by cash transfers, while respectively 6.3 and 7.8 Gini points reduction are due to direct personal taxes. It is also apparent that the differences between the countries' Ginis, particularly among the established democracies, are small, as we would expect from the countries which in terms of their income level, political system, and age structure of population are similar. The unweighted coefficient of variation of disposable income Gini is about 0.15-to be contrasted with the world coefficient of variation of about 0.35 (Milanovic, 1999) . Who benefits from redistribution-that is, as we move from factor to disposable income? Tables 2a and 2b show the average share gain for each of the bottom five deciles (defined according to their factor income). We define the "sharegain" as the difference between the share of a given decile of people formed according to factor income level in factor and disposable income. For example, if the bottom decile receives 2 percent of total factor income, while the same people receive 8 percent of total disposable income, the sharegain is 6 percentage points. The share of the bottom decile (formed according to factor income) increases, on average, by 5.7 percentage points in the entire sample or by 5.8 percentage points in EDs (going from respectively 0.3 and 0.2 percent of total factor income to 6 percent of disposable income). The people who are in the second decile according to factor income, gain, on average, 4.0 (the entire sample) or 4.2 (EDs only) percentage points. Their share increases from 1.9 and 1.8 percent of factor income to 5.9 or 6 percent of total disposable income. 10 The sharegain decreases with level of (factor) income, and becomes practically nil for the fifth decile. The combined poorest 50 percent of people according to factor incomes have a sharegain of 12.4 percentage points (in the entire sample) or 12.9 percentage points (for EDs only). The people in the upper half of factor income distribution are, of course, losers in redistribution. Tables 3a and 3b are identical to Tables 2a and 2b except that we now look at sharegain between factor P income and disposable income. The advantage of this measure is that it allows us not to treat pensions as a redistribution transfer. The extent of redistribution is often overestimated when we look at the sharegain between factor and disposable income (as in Tables 2a and 2b ). Consider the following. For many pensioners state pensions are often the only, or at least the most important, source of income. According to factor income, pensioners will tend to be ranked in lowestoften the lowest-income decile. Once we move from factor to gross and disposable income, their position dramatically improves simply because they have received a significant income source-a pension.
11 Everything else being the same, a country with many pensioners (i.e. with older population) will tend to show much larger redistribution: the sharegain will be greater. Now, if we take the view that pensions are not primarily a redistributive transfer and include them together with other factor incomes in factor P income, we can recalculate the sharegain as in Tables 3a and 3b. The extent of redistribution is halved. The sharegain goes down from more than 12 percentage points to 6 percentage points for the whole sample, 6.4 for the EDs. Note that the average sharegain is about halved for the first three deciles, it stays about the same for the fourth decile, and increases for the fifth decile. Note: Data for Belgium 88 and 92 show zero or almost zero income for the bottom two deciles according to factor income. If these zeros are inaccurate, redistribution may be overestimated. This is why a maximum redistribution country other than Belgium is shown as well. Maximum ( Note: Deciles formed according to household per capita factor (or factor P) income.
The increase in the share shows the difference between the factor income share of people who are in the bottom (second, third etc.) decile according to factor or factor P income and their share in disposable income. Table 4 shows extent of redistribution by country measured by the increase in the share of the people who are in the bottom quintile and bottom half of factor income distribution. (For simplicity, we shall refer to the bottom 20 and 50 percent of the population ranked according to factor income as respectively "the very poor", and "the poor".) The countries are ranked by the gain in the share of the bottom half. Belgium 85 and 88, and Poland 95 shows the largest redistribution both to the lowest quintile and lowest half of the population.
12 In Poland, pensions, which have grown compared to wages since the beginning of transition, are the key reason behind heavy redistribution. 13 As expected, Sweden, Germany and France are heavily redistributionist with the bottom half gaining between 18 and 22½ percentage points (between 1 and almost 2 standard deviations above the mean), and the bottom quintile gaining between 14 and 17percentage points (more than 1 standard deviation above the mean). Redistribution is the smallest in Taiwan, Switzerland, UK in the 1970's, and the US. In the US 97, for example, the bottom half gains about 8 percentage points (almost 1 standard deviation less than the mean); in Switzerland 82, 5.7 percentage points (almost 1½ below the mean). The table displays a very unique position of Taiwan. It is of particular interest since Taiwan is the only non-Western country in the sample.
14 Taiwan has by far the lowest factor income inequality, Gini of 31 vs. the mean sample Gini of 46. But, perhaps precisely because factor-income inequality is low, redistribution is nil. Neither the poor nor the very poor gain practically anything in their disposable income share (the bottom half gains between 0.3 and 1.4 percentage points). The complete data on shares and gains by decile and by country are given in Annex Tables  2 and 3.   Table 5 shows the redistributional gain when factor income is defined to include pension transfers. Both the extent of redistribution and the rankings of recipients change. The most redistributive are the Nordic countries: among the top five countries, four are Nordic; among the top ten countries, six are Nordic.
15 Also, once we eliminate pensions, the ranking of countries that have large transfers (most of which are often pensions) like Germany, Italy and France, and which appear very strongly redistributionist according to factor income (Table 4) slips significantly. In Germany in the 1980's, the poorest quintile gained only 3 to 4 percentage points as against 14-17 percentage points when calculations are made according to factor income. Italy is shown to be among the least redistributionist countries: the bottom quintile and the bottom half gain between 1 and 2 percentage points, even if according to factor income it is more redistributionist than average.
The data in Tables 4 and 5 allows us also to see how redistribution in individual countries has evolved through time. To illustrate it, we look in Figure 1 at four countries, and focus on the most redistributionist measure: sharegain of the bottom quintile using the factor P income. We see that, while during the Thatcher period social transfers in British might have gone down as percentage of GDP, the sharegain of the very poor improved significantly. So it did in Sweden and Canada, but not in the United States where the sharegain of the very poor in 1997 was the same as quarter of a century ago, and was far smaller than in the other three countries. 
III. Testing the redistribution hypothesis
As mentioned in Section I, the relationship we want to test is:
We shall use two variables to capture redistribution: how the share of (i) the bottom half and of (ii) the bottom quintile (ranked by factor income) increases when we move from factor (or factor P) to disposable income-the variables just displayed in Tables 3 and 4 . 16 We denote them respectively as sharegain50 and sharegain20.
Our hypothesis throughout is, of course, that both gain variables will be positively related to factor income inequality ( Im). Several variables can be used as indicators of factor income inequality: Gini coefficient of factor income (Gm); the share of the bottom half ( share50MM); or the share of the bottom quintile ( share20MM) where the double suffix MM indicate that we deal with (i) the distribution of factor (=market) income and (ii) that the recipients are ranked by their factor (=market) income. Tables 6a and 6b shows the results of different versions of (2) for two definition of factor income. In the version using the standard definition of factor income, we control for the share of population who are over 65 years of age.
17 This is not necessary in the factor P formulation because pensions are included as part of factor P income. In each table, I combine two indicators of redistribution against three indicators of factor income inequality.
We look first at Table 6a , full-sample regressions. The coefficients indicating that greater factor inequality is associated with greater gain of the poor and the very poor have everywhere the correct sign, and are throughout significant at 1 percent level. The same holds for the age variable in Table 6a . R 2 is between 0.44 and 0.67.
Consider the expected gain of the poor: each Gini point increase in factor inequality is accompanied by 0.39 percentage point gain of the poor (equation 1.1). If factor income inequality rises by one standard deviation (5.8 Gini points; see Table 1a ), the share of the poor in disposable income would, thanks to redistribution, increase by 2.3 percentage points, e.g. instead of getting 20 percent of disposable income, they would receive 22.3 percent. The share of the very poor would increase by 1.2 percentage points (0.205 from equation 1.2 times 5.9). The same results are obtained if instead of the Gini coefficient, we use the share of the bottom half of the population in market income ( Share50MM) or Share20MM. The results are even stronger with the factor shares as controls (R 2 and the t-values are greater). This may be due to the fact that redistribution occurs in response to low shares of the poor or very poor in factor income, which the Gini coefficient captures only imperfectly since it reflects the entire distribution (not only the bottom of it). On average, the gain of the very poor is about one-half of the gain of the poor (the coefficient on sharegain20 is about one-half of the coefficient on sharegain50). Table 6a . Redistribution as function of factor inequality (using factor income)
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All countries
Established democracies Note: t-values between brackets. Share50MM=share of total factor income received by the bottom half of the population ranked by factor income. Share20MM=share of total factor income received by the bottom quintile of the population ranked by market income. Note: t-values between brackets. Share50MM=share of total factor P income received by the bottom half of the population ranked by factor income. Share20MM=share of total factor P income received by the bottom quintile of the population ranked by market income.
The same equations are then run over the sample of established democracies where, as mentioned before, we expect to find the redistributional regularity to hold even more strongly. All the coefficients again have the right sign and are statistically significant at 1 percent level. Each Gini point increase in factor income inequality increases the share of the poor in disposable income by 0.475 percentage points, and the share of the very poor by 0.213 points. The coefficients on sharegain50 and sharegain20 are greater, in absolute amounts, than in the full-sample regressions. Thus, for example, a percentage point decrease in the factor-income share of the poor (Share50MM) increases the poor's share in disposable income by 0.76 points in established democracies and 0.65 points in the full sample (equations 2.1 and 2.3). The fact that the coefficients in equations 2 and 3 are less than unity indicates that redistribution does not fully compensate for the initially lower share of the bottom half. In other words, the poor in a country with lower factor income share of the poor (by 1 percentage point) would still end up with a disposable income share that is less, on average, by 0.24 percentage points (in EDs) or 0.35 points (in full sample) than the poor in a more factor-equal country. This is not the case for the very poor. The redistribution coefficients in equations 3.2 and 3.4 are throughout greater than 1. For the very poor, in effect, redistribution more than compensates for their initially lower factor share. Thus, each percent point drop in their factor income share increases the poor's share in disposable income by 1.3 percentage points (in established democracies) and 1.09 percentage points in established democracies. Ironically, the poor are eventually better off if they start worse off! In Table 6b , I run the same regressions as in Table 6a except that factor income is now replaced by factor P income. age65 is no longer needed as control variable. The redistribution coefficients have again the right sign and are but one are highly significant. However, the R 2 are significantly lower. They increase though as we move from equations 1 (factor Gini as control) to equations 3 ( share20MM as control). Once pensions are not part of social transfers, the redistribution that we capture concerns transfers directed to the very poor. These transfers therefore explain much better what happens to the very poor, as in equation 3. They matter much less for the rest of the population.
The most interesting regressions are 2.1 and 2.3 for the poor, and 3.2 and 3.4 for the very poor. The poor's gain is now half of what it was in earlier regressions when pensions were not part of factor income. For the full sample, the redistribution coefficient goes down, in absolute value, from 0.64 to 0.38 (equation 2.1). Similarly, for the very poor, the redistribution coefficient decreases from 1.09 to 0.69 (equation 3.2). Clearly, lots of redistribution simply occurs as result of pension payments. However, there is more than that. It is not simply that once pensions are included as part of factor income that total transfers (and redistribution) are less. There is also a re-ranking effect. By not considering pensions as part of factor income we treat many households who depend on pensions for the large part of their income as poor or very poor. However, once pensions are included in factor income, many of such households are no longer poor. Thus, with factor P definition, not only is redistribution, by definition, less but both the poor and very poor households are different. And transfers shorn of pensions capture much better what happens among the "new poor" (not pensioners) than among the others. How large is redistribution? We have seen that societies that start with a more unequal distribution of factor income are likely to exhibit greater redistribution. That gain is less-although it persists-when we move from standard definition of factor income to the one that includes pension transfers. Now, the question can be asked, Will redistribution be so large that the share of the poor will be independent, in terms of disposable income, of their starting position?
Results in Table 7 test the extent of the gain. The share of disposable income received by the poor, Share50DM, is positively related to their share in factor income whether we use the standard definition of factor income, or factor P income (see equations 1 and 3). Each percentage point increase in their "starting position", raises their share in disposable income by 0.355 (if we use factor income) or 0.615 percentage points (if we use factor P income). The situation is less clear cut when we look at the very poor. Their share in disposable income does not depend on how much they receive in the form of factor income (note the very small and statistically not significant coefficient in equation 2), but is positively related to their share in factor P income (equation 4).
Although the final position of the poor and the very poor does depend on what their initial share in factor and factor P income is, redistribution significantly reduces the differences which might exist between the countries at the factor income level. This is reflected in the fact that the coefficients associated with Share50MM and Share20MM are less than unity. Redistribution is therefore greater in societies that start by being more unequal, but is not so great as to make the position of the poor and the very poor independent of what their initial shares are. Figure 4 illustrated this on the example of disposable and factor income Ginis. The difference between the two Ginis increases in factor income Gini: in other words, redistribution increases in factor Gini, but the slope of the line AA is still positive-indicating that greater factor inequality still results, on average, in higher disposable income inequality. Share50DM=share of total disposable income received by the bottom half of the population ranked by factor (market) income . Share50MM=share of total market income received by the bottom half of the population ranked by factor (market) income. 
IV. Testing the median voter hypothesis
Our conclusions so far suggest a process of redistribution that is positively associated with initial inequality in factor incomes. This is simply an empirical finding. The problem is to find an economic explanation why such a particular redistribution would occur. The median voter hypothesis provides one possible explanation. The median voter hypothesis, in its most abstract version, posits that, if preferences are single-peaked, the median voter will decisively determine the level of redistribution, by selecting the tax rate and thus the amount of transfers (taxes are equal to transfers) that is optimal for him. Since it assumes that the tax rate is increasing in income, and transfers are flat, the poorer the median voter relative to the mean (or more generally, the lower his position in income distribution), the greater the incentive to vote for higher taxes, and thus for higher transfers.
It is important to be very clear what the hypothesis says. Firs t, it says that the median voter must gain from the process of redistribution: the transfers he receives must be greater than taxes he pays, for otherwise the optimal tax rate for him would be zero (Corollary 1). Second, it does not say that the median voter will necessarily gain more than any other: the very poor would, by definition, gain more than the median voter because they would receive the same amount of transfers, but will pay less in taxes (Corollary 2). Third, it says that the poorer, in relative terms the median voter, the larger his gain (Corollary 3). We shall look at how each of the three corollaries performs.
Let the median voter be the one belonging to the fifth and sixth decile of factor income distribution. We have already seen that sharegain of the fifth decile (and even more so of the sixth decile) is negative, regardless of what factor income definition we use. The same is true of their absolute (dollar or local currency) gain. Table 8 illustrates this fact: it shows that, with standard definition of factor income, the fifth decile on average loses through redistribution 3.6 percent of its disposable income, and the sixth decile almost 10 percent. Both are thus, on average, net tax payers. Out of 68 countries, 19 the fifth deciles is a net tax payer in 49 countries, while it gains in 19; 20 the sixth decile is a net tax payer in 54 countries, and gains in only 14. A typical relationship between cash transfers and taxes is shown in Figures 4a and 4b . The bottom three deciles gain; everybody else loses. Therefore, our Corollary 1 does not seem to hold: the median voter would be better off with a zero tax rate. However, this conclusion is not fully warranted because our data take into account cash transfers only. Overall cash transfers in our data base are in most cases (58 out of 68) less than taxes. 21 On average, direct taxes are 1.6 times greater than cash transfers (Table 8 ). For example, in the case of the Netherlands and the US shown in Figure 4 the tax-to-transfer ratio is respectively 1.8 and 2.5. If we added to cash transfers also transfers in kind (health, education, public administration etc.) which too are financed out of taxes, overall transfers would increase and it is quite likely that, under some reasonable apportioning of benefits from transfers in kind, the median voter may come out as net beneficiary. Still our data base does not allow us to test this hypothesis. We thus have to move to a weaker formulation of the median voter hypothesis, that is to test the Corollary 3. Note: Deciles formed according to household per capita factor income. 20 The countries where the net taxes of the fifth decile are negative (as the theory would predict it) are an interesting group: Sweden in 1992 and 1995 , Russia in 1992 , Taiwan in 1991 , Ireland in 1987 , Israel in 1992 , Italy in 1986 , Luxembourg in 1986 , France in 1979 , 1981 , 1984 and 1989 , and Czech republic in 1992 Note that taxes include both mandatory employee contributions and direct taxes. 22 The Corollary 2 is satisfied in all cases (see Annex Tables 2 and 3 ). We test Corollary 3 by looking at the relationship between R, the sharegain of the middle class (fifth and sixth decile according to factor income), and µ the position of the median voter (at the factor income level), and other variables Z.
Similar to the sharegain definitions above, we define the sharegain of the middle class as the change in the percentage of total income received by the fifth and sixth decile as one moves from factor to disposable income (sharegain5060). µ is alternatively defined as factor income share of the middle class ( Share5060MM), and median income expressed as percentage of mean income. In both formulations, we expect that an improvement in the relative position of the middle class in distribution of factor income will reduce its sharegain. The regressions are conducted for both definitions of factor income (factor income and factor P income). Cash transfers
Di rect taxes
The variable sharegain5060 is in all cases negative (see Annex Table  6 ). The mean sharegain5060 is minus 6 percentage points, and the range is from -12.1 (Belgium 1985) to -1.3 (Sweden 1995). The situation is the same if sharegain is defined with respect to factor P income. The mean sharegain5060 is then minus 4.5 percentage points and the range is from -14.5 to -1.1. But we expect that the sharegain will be greater in countries where the position of the middle class, before taxes and transfers "kick in", is worse. Table 9 gives the results. They show that each percentage point decrease in the factor income share of the middle class is associated with a 0.2 to 0.3 point increase in middle class sharegain. The coefficient is significant at 1 percent level in all formulations except in the case of EDs and factor P income. However, the R 2 's are much lower than in the test of the redistribution hypothesis. The fact that the coefficient is less than 1 implies that redistribution does not fully "compensate" the middle class in a more unequal country for its lower factor income share.
Regressions 2.1 and 2.2 (Table 9 ) tests the same hypothesis using the mean-to-median ratio as a proxy for the position of the middle class at the factor income level. With factor income, we see that a 10 percent increase in the ratio-that is a less favorable position of the middle class-rises the sharegain of the middle class by 6 percentage points (for the entire sample) and 10 percentage points (for established democracies). When we use factor P income, the coefficient ceases to be statistically significant and R 2 becomes practically zero. This means that once we eliminate pensions from cash transfers, the middle classes' gain or loss in redistribution is independent from the initial (factor) distribution. It is explained by the fact that middle classes receive little in the form of non-pension cash transfers such as unemployment benefits, social assistance and even family allowances. Thus, the median voter hypothesis fails when we focus on the truly redistributive transfers only. Note: t-values between brackets. Share5060MM=share of total factor income received by the fifth and sixth decile of the population ranked by factor income (=middle class). S haregain5060=middle class gain as one moves from factor to disposable income.
V. Conclusions
The purpose of the paper was to t wofold: to test the hypothesis of inverse relationship between inequality in distribution of factor income and redistribution, and one possible political channel of redistribution: the median voter hypothesis. The paper's approach is new in the sense th at for the first time both the dependent and the independent variable in the redistribution and the median voter hypotheses are correctly specified. The dependent variable is the extent of redistribution-income share gain of the lower half of income distribution according to factor income ('the poor"), or of the bottom quintile ("the very poor"), or the middle class (fifth and sixth decile). The independent variable is level of inequality of factor income or position of the middle class in factor income distribution. Neither of these two variables were used in previous work because they are not easily available. The hypothesis is tested on the sample of 24 countries, with a total of 79 observations. We find strong support for the redistribution hypothesis. More unequal factor-income countries redistribute more toward the poor and very poor. Consider a country A that has exactly the mean characteristics of our sample. Its factor Gini coefficient would be 46.3, and the bottom half of its population ("the poor"), would receive 19.4 percent of total factor income. When we move to disposable income distribution, that is include all government cash transfers and personal taxes, the country would have a Gini of 32.2, and the same people will have increased their share to 32.1 percent of total disposable income. The poor will have therefore gained a 12.7 percentage points share. Now, if we consider another country B, equal in all respects to A except that its factor income inequality is higher by 1 Gini point. The poor's gain in country B would reach 13.3 percentage points, i.e. the sharegain would be 0.65 percentage points greater. Although the redistribution would have gone far toward equalizing the position of the poor in the two countries, it would have still left the disposable-income position of the poor in country B worse than in A, because the sharegain is less than unity. For the very poor (the bottom quintile), however, redistribution is sufficiently strong to render their position in terms of disposable income share independent of their starting position (factor-income share).
The effects of redistribution become much more muted once pensions are taken out of transfers and treated as factor income. The negative sign between the poor's share in factor income and sharegain persists, and the coefficient remains statistically highly significant throughout, but is much smaller. It is about ½ of the previous size: between 0.3-0.4 rather than 0.6-0.7.
Unlike the evidence on the link between the extent of pro-poor redistribution, and factor income inequality, the evidence that redistribution takes place through the median voter channel is much weaker. Our databased on cash transfers-do not allow us to determine that the middle class is a net beneficiary of redistribution. Moreover, comparing cash transfers and taxes only, the middle income groups appear always to be losers. However, it is likely that, if one included transfers in kind, the middle classes may turn out to be net beneficiaries. Testing a weaker formulation of the median voter hypothesis-namely that lower factor income share of the middle class is associated with their greater sharegain-we find that it holds so long as pensions are included among cash transfers. Once we exclude them, there is no evidence that the middle classes that start from a less favorable factor income position do redistribute more in their own favor.
The median voter hypothesis fails once we focus on the truly redistributive transfers from which the middle classes contemporaneously gain little. This leaves us with three possible explanations. First, since those poorer than the middle classes contemporaneously gain, is the decisive voter at a level income lower than the median? This looks implausible since the recent work, if anything, has moved in the direction of finding the decisive voter at a level higher than the median (see Bassett, Burkett and Putterman, 1999) .
Second, lack of contemporaneous middle-class gain may mask a longrun middle-class gain from redistributive programs. Those currently in the middle class will not profit from current unemployment transfers. But they may be willing to finance them because they expect to receive them if they lose their jobs.
Third, a totally different political mechanism to explain redistribution may have to be defined. Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1991) , "Is inequality harmful for growth? Theory and evidence", National Bureau of Economic Research. Working paper series, No. 3599, January.
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